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Abstract 
The Henry George Theorem, which is originally established in a static model, asserts 
that the cost of public good provision should be equal to the total revenue of the land 
rent to achieve the optimal size of population of each region. This paper examines this 
theorem in a dynamic framework of overlapping generations model, assuming that the 
government maximizes the sum of the utilities of the generations of finite periods.  We 
show that the optimal path converges to the stationary state, however, it does not stay 
on it.  We derive that the theorem is valid only in the stationary state, and no longer 
valid along the optimal path.  
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1.  Introduction 
 
The purpose of this paper is to examine the Henry George theorem in a dynamic 
framework.   
The Henry George Theorem is about the optimal distribution of the population 
among regions in a country, or in other words, about the optimal number of regions in a 
country assuming the total population is fixed.   This theorem asserts that the optimal 
level of the expenditure on the public good equals the aggregate land rent.  That is, the 
revenue of the land rent should be all taxed and the tax-revenue should be all spent only 
for the provision of the public good.1   Then the optimal number of the population in 
each region is realized. 
  The Henry George theorem is related with the efficiency of the production side of the 
economy, and it guarantees the maximum per-capita consumption level for any given 
level of the public good.  It does not relate to the optimal supply of the public goods.   
Together with the condition of the optimal supply of the public good shown by 
Samuelson (1954), the total optimality is attained.  The Henry George theorem was 
first introduced into regional economics by Flatters, Henderson and Mieszkowski (1974) 
as the “Golden Rule”.  The name “the Henry George theorem” was first used by Arnott 
and Stiglitz (1979), based on the Single Tax theory of Henry George (1942). 1  
Henry George theorem was discussed in the framework of statics.  Later a number 
of variations of this theorem had been published, however, most of them were in the 
static framework. Hartwick (1980) examined the theorem when the regions are 
heterogeneous, and derived that the theorem should be modified.  Kanemoto, et al., 
(1996) discussed whether Tokyo exceeds the optimal size by using the idea of the Henry 
George theorem.   
We examine the Henry George theorem in a dynamic framework, because it is 
important for policy makers to know whether taking the Henry George policy is 
beneficial or not in a growing economy, or non-stationary economy in general.   We can 
imagine that, because the Henry George theorem holds in a static model, it also holds at 
the stationary state in dynamics.   Hence our main problem is whether it holds or not 
at  transient states.    
Fu (2005) discussed the theorem in a dynamic setting.  He used a simple  
continuous dynamic model and derived that the present value of land rents over all time 
periods equals the present value of public goods expenditure over all time periods. 
Our model uses a two-period overlapping generations model.  The individuals 
                                                  
1 The book was originally published in 1879. 
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determine the consumption of the two periods, the young age and the old age, given the 
public goods and the population of each region at each period. The government 
maximizes the sum of the utilities of each generation of the finite planning periods, 
and the control variables are the public goods and the size of the population of each 
period of each region. The government plays the role of the Stackelberg leader, while 
the residents the followers.  We derive the result that the Henry George theorem 
holds at the stationary state.  In fact, the optimal path converges to the stationary 
state, however, the path does not stay on it.  Thus, the Henry George theorem does 
not hold in any period.  However, it nearly holds when the path converges and stays in 
the neighborhood of it.    
We assumed that the durable good in this economy is only the land, hence, in order 
to save the income and convey the asset from the young age to the old one, people have 
to buy the land.  At the final period T , any people do not want to buy the land because 
there is no period 1T + .  So if there is no net land rent income at period 1T − , people 
in this period do not buy the land.   Thus if the government taxes 100% on the land 
rent at each period, then the people of all periods do not want to buy the land. We want 
to check that this really happens in the optimal path or not.  This is the reason why we 
assume the finite horizon planning period.   
In our dynamics, even the public goods are not storable.  The public good in our 
model can be interpreted as a consumption good jointly consumable without congestion 
such as defense service.   
In the next section, we will present the basic model.  In section III, the government 
policy to maximize the welfare is discussed, and we derive the optimal path of the 
economy.  In section IV, we examine the property of the optimal path and consider 
whether the Henry George theorem holds or not. In section V, we conclude our 
discussions.   
 
 
II. The Model 
 
The population of a country is distributed among homogeneous regions.  We 
assume that the number of the population of a country is fixed and there is no 
population growth.  Each individual lives for two periods.   He works at the first 
period in the agricultural sector, and earns the wage income w , which equals the 
marginal productivity of labor.  He consumes a part of the wage income and saves the 
rest.   As the means of the saving, he buys the land.   In the next period, he does not 
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work, but he receives the land rent and sells the land at the end of the period.  The 
income of the old period is spent on the consumption at the period.    The generations 
overlap, and there are young workers and the same number of old land owners, since 
we assume that there is no population growth.   Population is equally distributed 
over the homogeneous regions in a country.2  
Let us assume, for the sake of simplicity of explanation, that the square of the land 
available for region is limited to unity from geographical reason.3 All regions are 
homogeneous. Since the number of the regions is the control variable of the 
government, there exists a possibility that some lands may not be used for economic 
activities and remain vacant.  For technical reason, we assume that the number of 
available lands are finite.   
Since the size of the land is fixed, the production of each region is given only by the 
number of workers,  
.t tY N=                   (1) 
The people who was born at the beginning of period t  is called the generation t .  
The generation t works at period t and earns the wage income tw , and he faces the 
interest rate 1tr + .  Then the budget constraint is given by  
2
1 1
11
t
t t
t
cw c
r
+
+
= +
+
.                       (2) 
He maximizes the utility function,  
1 2
1 1 ,t t t t tu c c G G+ += + +      (3) 
subject to the budget constraint (2).  tG  denotes the public good in period t.   We 
assume that the public good is not storable.  Since the individual of the generation t 
determines the consumption of the periods t  and 1t +  so as to maximize the utility 
function (3), we have  
1 ,
2
t
t
wc =           (4) 
( )12
1
1
2
t t
t
w r
c ++
+
= .         (5) 
Thus the saving of the generation t per capita is given by  
                                                  
2 We do not examine the stability of the equilibrium, where population are equally 
distributed. 
3 Most of the literatures on the Henry George theorem assume that the size of the land 
in each region is determined endogenously, however, in result, the regions are all 
homogeneous since the conditions on those regions are assumed homogeneous.   
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1
2
t
t t t
ws w c= − = .        (6) 
Assume that there is only one way of storing the wealth, that is to buy the land.  
The saving ts  is spent to buy the land.  We assume that the older people of any 
regions can buy the land of any other regions.  Since the government can determine the 
number of the regions at each period, there should be some regions which happen to be 
unpopulated suddenly.  Then the land owners suffer loss.  In order to avoid 
asymmetry among landowners, we assume that all landowners are homogeneous, and 
people can buy any lands of any other regions.   The important assumption is that it is 
not  known to the people that what regions vanish in the government’s plan.   Thus, 
the expected profit rate from the land is common to all.   Let tP  denote the value of 
the land of one region, then the total land value of this economy is given by t tPn , where 
tn  stands for the number of the regions at period t. .   Since the total population is 
fixed at unity, we have 1/t tn N= .  Then the saving of the total population of this 
country is given by, since it is all invested into the land, 
t
t
t
P s
N
=  .       (7) 
The total saving of the society is  
2 2
t t
t t t
w wS N n= = .   The land rent income of the 
generation t at period t+1 is given by 11 1
1
t
t t
t
YY N
N
+
+ +
+
∂
−
∂
in each region.   They also 
receives the revenue from selling the land to the younger generation, who are willing to 
pay the saving.  Here, we assume that the tax to supply the public good is levied on the 
land rent.  Then the generation 0’s net income of period 1 is given by 
1
1 1 1 1 12
wN w N N G− + − , where 1G , which was already assumed to be the amount of 
the public good, and we assume here that it also denotes the cost to finance this amount 
of the public goods.  Hence per-capita income is given by 1 10
11
1
2
w Gi
NN
= − − .  Then 
the consumption of the old age of the generation 0 is given by 
2 1 1
1
11
1
2
w Gc
NN
= − −       (8) 
 For the generation t, for, 2 1t T≤ ≤ − , the per-capita net income of the old age is  
1
1
1
1
2
2
t
t
t
t
t
N
Gwi
N
+
+
+
+
−
= + .         (9) 
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 They save 
2
t
t
w
s =  at the end of period t and receives the net income ti  at the end of 
the period t+1, hence the interest rate for the saving 1tr +  is given by  
1 1tt
t
ir
s+
= − .                                         (10) 
The interest rate can be negative, but it is greater than 1− , otherwise, people do not 
save.  Since the wage rate is determined by the marginal productivity of labor, it is 
given by  
1
2t t
w
N
= .                                     (11) 
Then (10) is rewritten as 
2
1 1 1
1
3 8t t t t
t
t
w w w Gr
w
+ + +
+
− −
=   .                         (12) 
At the final period T , the total income of the old age of the generation 1T −  is  
2
T
T
T
T
N
G
i
N
−
= ,       (13) 
since the generation T does not succeed the land.  The generation T’s income Tw  is 
all spent for the consumption and we have  
1
T Tc w= .                                                       (14) 
Then the interest rate of the final period Tr is given by  
2
1
1
2 8T T T T
T
T
w w w Gr
w
−
−
− −
= ,        (15) 
form (6),(10),(11) and (13).   
Thus, the time sequence of the interest rate { }tr  is determined when that of the 
wage rate { }tw and the public good { }tG  are given.   We assumed that the 
government’s control variables are the wage rate and the population size of each region, 
however, hereafter we treat the wage rate { }tw  and the interest rate { }tr  are the 
control variables for the sake of simplicity. 
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III. Welfare Analysis 
 
We discuss the government behavior to maximize the welfare.  The government 
aims to maximize the sum of the utilities of the generations of finite periods as   
1
T
W uτ
τ =
= .          (16) 
   We solve the finite time horizon problem, because we are interested in the optimal 
solution of the initial and the final periods.   The first generation, who is the old 
generation at period 1, owns the land initially.   His consumption at period 1 is given 
by (8).    We have to redefine the utility function for the generation 0 because he lives 
only for one period and only consumes at the old age.   We define that his utility is 
composed of his consumption 21c  and the public good 1G  given by 
21
1 1 1
3 4
2o
wu G w G= − + ,        (17) 
from (8).  And the utility of the generation t, for 2 1t T≤ ≤ − , is given by  
1
1
1
2
t t
t t t
w r
u G G+ +
+
= + + ,        (18) 
from (3),(4) and (5).  For the final period T , the generation T ’s consumption is given 
by (14), and his utility is assumed to be  
T T Tu w G= + .             (19) 
The government maximizes the sum of the utilities from the generations 1 to T .  
The constraint of the government is the sequence of the interest rate given by (12) and 
(15), which is equivalent to the market equilibrium condition of each period4.  In order 
to solve the problem of the government, we form the Lagrangian,  
                                                  
4 The equations (12) and (15), which shows the interest rate of each period, together 
with the budget constraint of individuals (2) and the optimal condition of the labor 
employment (11), lead us to the market equilibrium condition  
( )1 2t tt t tY c c n G= + +  for 1 t T≤ ≤ .       (f1) 
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2 1 21
1 1 1 1 2
21
1 1
1
2 1
2
1
1
13 4
2 2
1 3 8
2
2 8 .
T
T T T T
T T T T
T
w rwL G w G G G
w r w w G wG G r
w
w w G ww G r
w
τ τ τ τ τ τ
τ τ τ τ
τ τ
λ
λ
−
+
−
+
=
−
−
−
   +
= − + + + +        
  +
− −
+ + + + −     
 
− −
+ + + −  
  (20) 
Let us solve this maximization problem.  Differentiating (20) w.r.t. , ,  and t t t tr G wλ , we 
obtain the first order conditions, 
1 0,                                       for 2
4 1
t
t
t t
wL t T
r r
λ −∂ = + = ≤ ≤
∂ +
      (21) 
2
1
2 1
1 1 1
2
1
2 1 0,               for    1,                         (22 1)         
3 4
2
81 0,                                for   2                   (22 2)
t
t
t
tt
w t
Gw G wL
G
w t T
wG
λ
−

− + = = −
−∂ 
= ∂  + = ≤ ≤ −
    
2
1
1
2
1
1
3 8 0,                   for 2 1                (23 1)
2 8 0,                for                            (23-2)     
t t t t
t
t
t T T T t
T
T
w w G wr t T
wL
w w G wr t T
w
λ
−
−
−
−

− −
− = ≤ ≤ − −∂ 
= ∂
− −
− = =
 
21 1
2 2 2 2
2 2
2 1
1 1 1
2
1 1 1 1
1 2
1
2 1
1
3 4 3 84 0,                       for 1               (24 1)
23 4
2
1 3 16 3 8 0,      for 2,  (24 2)
2
1 3 16
2
t t t t t t t
t t
t t
t
T T T T
T
G w R w G w t
ww G w
r w G w w G wL 2 t T
w ww
r w G w
λ
λ λ
λ
− + + +
+
−
− −
−
−
−
+ + = = −
−
+
− − −∂
− + = ≤ ≤ − −
=
∂
+
− −
−
2
1
2
2 1
1
2 8 0,   for 1,        (24 3)
1 2 16 0 ,                                                for .            (24 4)
2
T T T
T
T T
T T
T
TT
w G w t T
w w
G w t T
ww
λ
λ
−
−
−
−

−
+ = = − −
− +
+ = = −
 
From (21), we have 
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1                        for   2 .
4 1
t
t
t
w t T
r
λ −= − ≤ ≤
+
      (25) 
From (22-1), we derive 1G , and from (22-2) and (25), tG  for 2 t T≤ ≤  as  
( )21 1
4
3               for    1,                                                (26 1)
8 1
1                            for   2 .                                        (26 2)
4
t
t
t
t
w w
G
r t T
w

= − +
= 
+ ≤ ≤ −
 
Then from (26-2) and (23-1,2), eliminating tG , we have the difference equations for 
1tw −  for 2 t T≤ ≤ ,  
( )
( )
( )
3
2
1 3
2
3 2 2
                    for  2 1,                             (27 1)
1
2 1
                    for  .                                       (27 2)
1
t t
t t
t
T T
T T
w r
t T
r w
w
w r
t T
r w
−

− −
≤ ≤ − −
+
= 
− −
= −
+
.
  
For 1t = , from (24-1),(25),(26-1,2), we obtain the difference equation, which gives 1w  
from 2w  and 2r ,   
( )
( )
23
12 2
1 22 2
2 2 1 1
6 13 2(1 ) 2 1 0 .
1 1
ww r w r
w r w w
−
− +
− + + =
+ +
                     (28) 
Then (27-1) and (28) both determine 1w  given 2w  and 2r .  Those two equations have 
to give the same value of 1w .   This implies that the initial value of the difference 
equation system, i.e., either Tw or Tr should be properly determined. For 2 2t T≤ ≤ − , 
from (24-2), (25), (26-2) and (27-2), we have  
( ) ( )
32
1 1
1 3
1 1
1
3 1 1 4 1 .
3 2(1 )
t t
t t t
t t
r w
r r r
w r
+ +
+
+ +
 +
+ + + = +   
− + 
        (29) 
For 1t T= − , from (24-3),(26-2) and (27-2), we have a slightly different equation, 
( ) ( ) 321
1 3
1 1
3 1 1 .
2 1
T T T
T T
T T
r r w
r r
w r
−
−
 + +
+ + + =   
− − 
               (30) 
For t T= , from (24-4), (25) and (26-2), we have  
5/ 2 3
1 1 0
2 2
T T
T T
w wr r+ − + − = .                                (31) 
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Then tr  is given by  
( )
2
1 1 1
1
3
2
1 1
1
3
1 1
2
1 1 1
1
1 1 6
1,
1
                     where     for   2 - 2,    (32-1)3 (1 )
2
1 1 6
1,
                     where   
t t t
t
t t
t
t t
t t t
t
t
r r A
A
r w
A t T
w r
r r B
r
B
+ + +
+
+ +
+
+ +
+ + +
+
 + + + +
−   
  +
= ≤ ≤  
− + 
 + + + +
= −   
( ) 321 +1
1 3
1 1
25
2
1
     for     1,       (32 2)
(1 )
81 1 1,                                          for     .            (32 3)
16
t t
t
t t
T
T
r w
B t T
w r
w t T
w
+
+
+ +
  +
= = − −   
− +   
+ + − = −      
(29),(30) and (31) give (32-1), (32-2) and (32-3) , respectively.  (32-3) is not a difference 
equation, and which shows the relation between Tw  and Tr .  If Tr  is determined, 
then Tw  is determined.  Then at 1t T= − , from (32-2) 1Tr − , and from (27-2), 1Tw −  
are determined.  Similarly, from (32-1) and (27-1), 2Tw −  and 2Tr −  are determined, 
and so forth.  And as shown in the above, (27-1) gives 1w , and (28) also gives 1w , those 
two should be the same value.   
(32-1,2) are the difference equations of the form of ( )1 ,t t tr w r− = Φ  and (27-1,2) are 
those of ( )1 ,t t tw w r− = Ψ . 
 
 
IV   The Property of the Optimal Path 
Firstly, we have to check the transient path, and show that the optimal path does not 
stay on the stationary state.  From (27-1) and (32-1) or (29), we have the stationary 
state of the wage rate and the interest rate as follows: 
  * *1,  0.w r= =           (33) 
If we assume that the optimal path is on the stationary state in 2 2t T≤ ≤ − , then 
1, 0t tw r= =  holds in this interval.  Then from (27-1), we have 1 1.w =   But from (28) 
we cannot derive 1 1.w =  This leads to a contradictory.  Thus we derived the next 
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theorem. 
 
Theorem 1: 
The optimal path does not stay on the stationary state given by (33).    
 
Next, we derive the dynamic behavior of this optimal path.  First, let us see the 
stationary state of 2 2t T≤ ≤ − , which is given from (27-1) and (32-1) or (29).  We can 
easily have the stationary state level of the variables,   * *0 and 1.r w= =   We define 
1t t tw w w −Δ = − , or the increment of tw  from 1tw − .  Similarly, 1t t tr r r −Δ = −  is defined.  
The curve 0wΔ =  is given by  
3
3
2 2
2
wr
w
−
=
+
             (34) 
from (27-1) setting 1t tw w −= .    And that of  0rΔ =  is given by  
( ) ( )
32
3
1
4 4 1 .
3 2(1 )
r w
r r
w r
 +
+ = +  
− + 
         (35) 
from (29).   The graphs of 0wΔ = and 0rΔ =  are shown in Figure 1.   We can check 
the saddle point property of our difference equation system as follows:  Totally 
differentiating (27-1) and (32-1) or (29), we obtain5  
1
1
7 3
7124
7
t t
t t
dw dw
dr dw
−
−
−     
=    
−     
.             (36) 
The characteristic roots of the matrix of (36) are 11 6 2
7
− ± , or  －2.783 and －0.359.  
One of the absolute values of those two characteristic roots is less than one, and the 
other is greater than one.   This shows that the stationary state is a saddle point.  In 
Figure 1, we show the phase diagram.   The arrows in the diagram show the direction 
of the movement of the point.  When under a differential equation system, in this case, 
there exists a pair of the stable arms which monotonically converge to the stationary 
state.   However, our system is not a differential equation system but a difference 
equation system.  Then there exists the possibility of overshooting.   The solution 
                                                  
5 (35) is a backward differential equation system.   We can easily derive the forward 
system as 1
1
7 24
713
7
t t
t t
dw dw
dr dw
−
−
−     
=    
−     
.   The characteristic roots of the matrix are the 
same.  
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path does not necessarily converge monotonically to the stationary state.   We actually 
numerically solved our difference equation system and show the result.    
 
[Figure 1 around here] 
  
We have derived the optimal dynamic path of the wage rate { }tw  and the interest 
rate { }tr .  In the background, the optimal path of the public goods { }tG  is 
determined.  We have to note that there exist some regions which vanish or emerge in 
the process, however for those regions, the optimal path of the public good is on the   
derived path{ }tG as long as those regions exist.  
We calculated the optimal path of for the cases of 5T =  and 12T = .6  The path of 
each case is shown in Table 1 and 2, respectively.   Both cases show that the path 
converges to the stationary state ( * *1,  0w r= = ), and spend most of the time near it as 
the planning period T increases as shown in Table 1 and 2.7  The optimal path 
oscillates around the stationary state.   This is due to the overshooting because our 
system is a difference equation system.   
 
[Table 1 and 2 around here ] 
 
The optimal path of { }tw  is shown in Figure 2.    The path of the interest rate is 
shown in Figure 3.   Those two exhibit the same property that the paths converge to 
the stationary state in the middle of the planning periods.    
 
[Figure 2 and 3 around here] 
 
 
IV-2.  Reconsideration of the Henry George Theorem. 
 
As shown in Theorem 1, the optimal path does not stay on the stationary state.   
Then what about the Henry George theorem?  In the periods 2 2t T≤ ≤ − , the land 
rent minus public goods expenditure is given by  
                                                  
6 We used Maple 11  to calculate the optimal path. 
7 This is so called the “turnpike” property. 
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3
4 4
1 11
2 4 4 4
t t t t
t
t t t
N r w rG
w w w
+ − −
− = − = ,       (37) 
from (11) and (26-2).    It is evident from (33) that only at the stationary state (37) 
vanishes and the Henry George theorem holds.  However, if the optimal path is off the 
stationary state, the theorem does not hold.   
 
Theorem 2: 
On the stationary state, the Henry George theorem is valid at each period, but off 
the stationary state, the theorem is not valid. 
 
Fu (2005) examined the Henry George theorem in an ordinary continuous dynamic 
model where public good accumulates, and derived the result that in terms of the 
discounted sum the land rent and public goods expenditure are equal.  In our model, 
however, where there is no accumulation of the public goods, those two are not equal.  
We are apprehensive that if the government were to continue to take the Henry 
George policy then 1Tr = −  holds and possessing the land does not play the role of the 
store of value.   Hence, for the generation t , for 2 1t T≤ ≤ − , the utilities are all zero, 
because they cannot  consume at all in the old age .  This policy is evidently not 
optimal.  In the reality, in our numerical example, the government does not take the 
Henry George policy every period, and Tr  is actually greater than minus one.  Hence, 
there exists an incentive to posses the land for generation 1T − , thus, for all 
generations.   
 
V. Concluding Remarks 
 
We re-examined the Henry George theorem in a dynamic framework of the 
overlapping generations model where public goods cannot be accumulated.  We derived 
that the Henry George theorem does not hold in general.   Only at the stationary state, 
the theorem holds, however, the optimal path does not stay on the stationary state, but 
converges to it and stays most of the periods near it as the planning period T increases.   
In our model, there is no state variable, and any variable can jump to any level.   
Though there exists a possible choice to jump to the stationary state, but we showed 
that this jump is not optimal.  These findings were possible only in a finite horizon 
planning, where the starting point and final point are determined endogenously.     
There exist regions which vanish in the process, or emerge in the process. The land 
14 
 
value of the region which vanishes in the process is smaller than the other regions 
which continue to exist.   Then our assumption that all regions are homogeneous is not 
satisfied.   To avoid the complexity, we assumed that all lands are in a basket and 
people buy a portion of this basket, so the all portions of the basket are homogeneous.   
To relax this assumption is the next extension of this model.     
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  Table 1: T=5 
   
t W r 
1 0429 ― 
2 1.121 0.426 
3 0.906 -0236 
4 1.212 0.604 
5 0.657 -0.976 
 E•
 
-1 
w
r  0rΔ =
0wΔ =
Figure 1:  The Direction of the Optimal path  
0 
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Table 2: T=12 
t w r 
1 0.740 ― 
2 1.111 0.413 
3 0.962 -0.118 
4 1.013 0.045 
5 0.995 -0.015 
6 1.000 0.003 
7 1.002 0.005 
8 0.991 -0.020 
9 1.023 0.059 
10 0.935 -0.152 
11 1.197 0.540 
12 0.659 -0.773 
 
 
 
 
*w  
w  
t
Figure 2:   
The path of the wage rate 
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Figure 3:   
The path of the interest rate 
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